Cyberattack and Fault Detection and Isolation in Cyber-Physical Systems

Overview

During my Ph.D. studies, I investigated stealthy deception cyberattacks in cyber-physical systems (CPS), including power systems, aircraft, and multi-spacecraft systems. These attacks exploit system dynamics to evade conventional residual-based and observer-based detection methods.

Key Contributions

• Derived theoretical conditions under which cyberattacks remain undetectable in linear and nonlinear dynamical systems
• Identified fundamental limitations of existing monitoring architectures
• Developed dynamic coding scheme–based defenses that prevent:
  • zero-dynamics attacks
  • controllable attacks
  • covert attacks

Impact

The proposed defenses guarantee attack detectability without requiring attack models, and have been validated on aerospace and networked control systems using a hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) platform.
These contributions are published in leading control journals and conferences.